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Cross-Cultural Universality of Knowledge Attribution 
 
Since the first reports of significant cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions 
(Weinberg, Nichols & Stich, 2001), the field of epistemology has been haunted by the 
idea that epistemic intuitions are arbitrary.1 Epistemologists generally assume that 
epistemic intuitions constitute evidence for or against their theories. If those intuitions are 
contingent on people’s cultural background (among other arbitrary factors), epistemology 
based on Anglo-Americans’ intuitions is like an anthropological report of Anglo-
American table manners: parochial and non-normative.  
In this paper, we provide substantive evidence that, pace advocates for epistemic 
cultural contingencies, epistemic intuitions are strikingly universal across cultures. Part I 
recounts the initial reports of cross-cultural differences as well as the theoretical and 
empirical responses that have followed. Part II presents the series of studies that we 
implemented in other cultures: Mainland China, South Korea, and Taiwan. We 
purposefully selected three recent and surprising experimental studies on knowledge 
attribution conducted with Anglo-American populations and replicated them with people 
from other cultures in their native tongues. We found that the same patterns emerged 
across cultures: for all three of our studies, the patterns of knowledge attribution among 
our Chinese and Korean participants were entirely consistent with the patterns originally 
found among English speakers. Part III posits the universality hypothesis on the basis of 																																																								
1 Broadly speaking, epistemic intuitions include intuitions about knowledge attribution, epistemic 
justification and so forth. As the focus of this paper is on intuitive knowledge attribution, we employ the 
phrase “epistemic intuition” interchangably with a more precise phrase “intuitive knowledge attribution” 
for the sake of simplicity.  
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recent empirical studies including ours. It states that epistemic intuitions are to a great 
extent universal across cultures, which is compatible with the existence of minor cultural 
variations in people’s epistemic intuitions. We further employ this hypothesis to argue for 
a new epistemological discourse: a shift away from the discourse of cross-cultural 
differences and toward a discourse of cross-cultural universality.  
 
1. The Alleged Cross-Cultural Differences 
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001)—WNS in short—stirred a firestorm of debate over 
cross-cultural differences concerning people’s epistemic intuitions. The authors selected a 
series of influential cases in epistemology (e.g., TrueTemp cases, Gettier cases, and the 
case of a cleverly disguised mule) and tested them among participants at Rutgers 
University who differed in terms of either cultural or socioeconomic background. In 
those tests, they asked the participants to judge whether the protagonist in those cases had 
knowledge or not. They reported statistically significant differences in knowledge 
attribution between contrasting demographic groups for a significant portion of those 
tests. 
Though WNS examined cultural and socioeconomic divergences of people’s 
epistemic intuitions, the former received more attention from the philosophical 
community. The most striking cross-cultural difference was reported about Gettier cases, 
the types of cases introduced in Gettier (1963). They reported that while the majority of 
Westerners refrained to attribute knowledge to the agent—the standard answer in the 
philosophical literature—the majority of East Asians did the opposite. Given the 
symbolic status of Gettier cases as a showcase of the evidential role of intuitions in 
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epistemology, such a cultural divergence was deeply concerning. WNS used the results to 
launch the following argument. Since intuitions are contingent on arbitrary factors such 
as ethnicity, they should not be trusted as evidence bearing on the nature of knowledge. 
Otherwise, epistemology is saturated with ethnocentrism. 
Theorists raised numerous objections to WNS. Some disputed the validity of 
WNS’s methodology. Kauppinen (2007) argued that intuitions gathered in surveys of lay 
people are not the same sort of reflective intuitions that philosophers are able to tap into 
as a result of their training and reflection. Sosa (2009) provided an alternative explanation 
for WNS’s results claiming that Eastern Asians and Westerners may have different 
linguistic interpretations of the cases. Others challenged WNS’s argument on theoretical 
grounds. Notably, Nagel (2012, 2013) appealed to a universal and arguably innate human 
capacity for “theory of mind”—roughly the capacity to comprehend other people’s 
mental states—and argues that, because the concept of knowledge and the capacity for 
knowledge attribution is a basic element of people’s theory of mind, we should expect 
epistemic intuitions to converge among various cultural groups. Similarly, Hannon (2015) 
posits that concepts evolve to serve particular communicative needs of a linguistic 
community. A concept as fundamental as “knowledge” serves some basic, crucial needs 
shared by all cultures. Thus, we should expect that different languages each feature a 
word largely equivalent to the English word, “knowledge.” Still others rejected WNS’s 
basic assumption. Cappelen (2014) argue that WNS “has been engaged in an attack on a 
strawman,” because “philosophers don’t rely on intuitions” in the first place (Cappelen 
2014: 269).  
As theoretical debates raged on, the empirical evidence against WNS also accrued. 
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Three independent replication studies (Nagel 2013, Kim & Yuan 2015; Seyedsayamdost 
2015) failed to find the alleged demographic effects. Moreover, recent empirical findings 
offered initial positive support for cross-cultural universality. Machery et al. (2015, 2017) 
found that participants from a wide-range of countries, responding to cases in their native 
languages, shared the Gettier intuition. Rose et al. (2017) found that participants across 
the world did not take knowledge to be sensitive to practical stakes. The aforementioned 
studies taken together strongly suggest that epistemic intuitions are more universal than 
previously believed.  
 
2. Studies 
We aim to further test the hypothesis that epistemic intuitions are robustly universal 
across cultures. In designing our studies, we purposely selected recently discovered and 
sometimes surprising patterns of epistemic intuitions found among English speakers. If 
these quirky effects emerge across cultures, it constitutes substantive evidence for a 
robust level of cross-cultural universality in epistemic intuitions. Three effects that we 
selected include (1) the perceptual vs probabilistic evidence effect, namely that ceteris 
paribus people are less willing to ascribe knowledge to true beliefs based on probabilistic 
evidence than for true beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Friedman & Turri 2014); (2) 
the Gettierized epistemic side effect effect (GESEE), namely that ceteris paribus people 
are more willing to attribute knowledge to a protagonist when she engages in harmful 
activities than when she engages in beneficent activities even in Gettierized scenarios 
(Buckwalter 2014); and (3) the knowing without believing effect, namely that in certain 
cases, people are willing to attribute knowledge to a protagonist while denying her the 
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corresponding belief (Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013). Our studies were created by 
translating the vignettes and questions from the original studies conducted in English into 
both Korean and Chinese, and were then carried out among our Korean and Chinese 
participants.  
  
2.1 Probabilistic vs. Perceptual Evidence Effect 
There is an ongoing philosophical debate regarding the epistemic status of beliefs based 
on probabilistic evidence in contrast to beliefs based on other sorts of evidence 
(perceptual evidence as a paradigmatic example).2 Many argue that the belief that a 
lottery ticket will be a loser is not an instance of knowledge, despite the overwhelmingly 
low probability of winning the lottery.3 This denial of knowledge seems to signal an 
extremely high standard of knowledge attribution in respect to credence (cf. Hawthorne 
2004). However, when confronted with beliefs based on perceptual evidence (e.g., the 
striped animal I see in front of me is a zebra), philosophers do not seem to harbor a 
similarly high epistemic standard. Even if it is made salient that the striped animal could 
be a cleverly painted mule, people are generally more willing to regard the true belief that 
the creature is a zebra as an instance of knowledge. This suggests that knowledge 
requires something more than high credence, though controversy remains regarding 																																																								
2 The contrast also holds between probabilistic evidence and evidence based on testimony, deduction 
and so forth. We will focus on the contrast between probabilistic evidence and perceptual evidence for two 
reasons. First, perceptual evidence is often the ultimate basis for other sources of evidence such as 
testimony. Second, Friedman and Turri’s study, based on which we modeled our study, also focuses on the 
contrast between probabilistic and perceptual evidence. 
3 For a contrary, minority stand on the issue, see Turri 2011. 
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precisely which properties disqualify probability-based beliefs as instances of knowledge 
despite their extremely high probability to be true.  
While philosophers have tried to develop a systematic answer to such questions 
(Dretske 1981; Lewis 1996; Neta 2011), Friedman and Turri (2014) have confirmed that 
the lay concept of knowledge embodies this feature. Their participants were found to be 
more willing to attribute knowledge to beliefs based on perceptual evidence (78% and 
73% did so in the zoo and farm cases respectively) than on probabilistic evidence (11% 
did so in the lotto case). The cases are as follows: 
 
Lotto Case 
Abigail is out shopping with her son. In a store, they see a man with a super lotto 
ticket. Abigail’s son says, “I bet that ticket’s not a loser. It might win the jackpot!” 
Abigail answers, “It is a losing ticket.” And Abigail is exactly right: the ticket is a 
loser. 
Question: Does Abigail know or only believe that the ticket is a loser? 
 
Zoo and Farm Cases (Differences between the two stories are bracketed) 
Abigail is [visiting the zoo/driving past a farm] with her son. In a [pen/field], they 
see a black-and-white striped animal. Abigail’s son says, “I bet that’s not a real 
zebra. It might be a painted mule!” Abigail answers, "It is a real zebra." And 
Abigail is exactly right: the animal is a zebra. 
Question: Does Abigail know or only believe that the animal is a zebra? 
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Our first study examines whether the perceptual vs. probabilistic evidence effect is 
cross-culturally universal. We used the authors’ original vignettes: lotto, zoo and farm. 
After translating them into Korean and Chinese, we administrated the study to our 
Korean and Chinese populations. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three 
cases. Beside asking the question “Does Abigail know or only believe that the animal is a 
zebra?”, we also asked them “How confident are you in the answer you just gave? [1(not 
at all confident) to 7 (completely confident)].”4 
 
 
Korean Study  
Of the 241 Korean participants recruited through the popular Korean social media 
and communications platform “Kakaotalk,” 210 participants provided correct answers to 
all of the check questions. The analyses were conducted on the 210 participants who 
provided correct answers to all the check questions. Following the method first developed 
by Starmans and Friedman (2012), we used the response to the knowledge attribution 
question and the reported confidence to calculate a “weighted knowledge ascription” for 
each participant by multiplying her knowledge attribution response (really knows = 1; 
only believes = -1) by her reported confidence (1 to 7). Weighted knowledge ascriptions 
																																																								
4 We also asked participants other questions as included in Friedman and Turri’s original study: check 
questions, questions about justification, and so forth. For the full list of the questions, see Friedman and 
Turri 2015, p.1066. 
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range from -7 (fully confident knowledge denial) to 7 (fully confident knowledge 
ascription).5  
The means of the weighted knowledge attribution scores in the three cases above 
are displayed in Figure 1. As the graph demonstrates, the perceptual vs. probabilistic 
evidence effect emerged among our Korean participants. A one-way ANOVA showed a 
significant effect of condition, F(2, 207)=19.4, p<.001. Tukey’s tests showed that the 
weighted knowledge ascription in the Lotto case (M=-4.3, SD=4.1) was lower than that 
in the zoo case (M=1.4, SD=5.9), p<.001, and the Farm case (M=-.09, SD=6.0), p<.001. 
There was no significant difference between the zoo case and the farm case, p=.24. 
 
																																																								
5 This computation is applied uniformly to the first two studies in the paper, and we will not repeat it 
when reporting the other study.  
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Figure 1: Mean of Korean participants' weighted knowledge ascriptions about 
perceptual vs probabilistic evidence effect  
 
Taiwanese Study 
Among our 84 Taiwanese participants, recruited on the popular social media and 
communications platform “Line,” 78 participants provided correct answers to all of the 
check questions. Analyses were conducted on these participants.  
As Figure 2 indicates, we found that the perceptual vs probabilistic evidence effect 
emerged in our Taiwanese population as well. A one-way ANOVA showed a significant 
effect of condition, F(2, 75)= 13.1, p<.001. Tukey’s tests showed that the weighted 
knowledge ascription in the Lotto case (M= -4.65, SD=4.0) was lower than that in the zoo 
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case (M=2.4, SD=5.9), p<.001, and the farm case (M=2.2, SD=5.7), p<.001. There was no 
significant difference between the zoo case and the farm case, p=.99.  
 
 
Discussion 
In summary, our studies found that the perceptual vs probabilistic evidence effect 
observed in Friedman and Turri’s Anglo-American population also emerged in Korean 
and Taiwanese populations. Namely, participants from all three populations were more 
likely to attribute knowledge to beliefs based on perceptual evidence than beliefs based 
on probabilistic evidence. 
  
2.2 Gettierized Epistemic Side-Effect Effect (GESEE)  
Figure 2: Mean of Taiwanese participants' weighted knowledge ascriptions about perceptual 
vs probabilistic evidence effect 
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Knowledge is concerned with evidence, justification, reliability, the soundness of 
deductive and inductive reasoning, and so forth—in other words, whatever faithfully 
leads to truth. Many philosophers think of knowledge exclusively as the hallmark of truth 
that must be acquired in the right ways. Recently, however, an increasing number of 
philosophers have started to look beyond factors that link knowledge to truth. They 
observe that besides the tight conceptual link between knowledge and truth, knowledge is 
also tightly linked to action, skill, norms of communication and so forth (cf. e.g., Fantl 
and McGrath 2010; Stanley 2005) This sheds light on an array of factors that have long 
been ignored in epistemology, and also raises empirical questions about whether the lay 
concept of knowledge is sensitive to those factors (cf. e.g., Schaffer & Knobe 2010; 
Sripada and Stanley 2012). 
Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) introduced yet another layer of complexity when 
they first reported empirical evidence that our concept of knowledge is also responsive to 
moral valence. Buckwalter (2013) further observed that moral valence would affect 
ordinary folk knowledge attribution even in Gettierized cases. The following is a pair of 
cases (with harm/benefit variants—the manipulated words in either variant are in the 
brackets) tested in Buckwalter’s 2013 study: 
 
[Pump Case] Sam’s job is to pump water into the cistern, which then supplies the 
water to the farms owned by several families in the community. One day, as Sam 
operates the pump, he hears a broadcast on the radio. The radio report says that 
local officials suspect a new chemical from a nearby factory, chemical X, may have 
found its way into the local reservoir, and that there is a chance it will be very 
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[beneficial/poisonous] to all the local townspeople’s crops. Sam thinks to himself, 
“I don’t care about their crops; I just want to earn my pay,” and continues pumping 
the water. Sure enough, the crops started [thriving/dying]. It turned out that the 
local officials were completely wrong about the chemical in the water. After 
analyzing the water, they found no trace of chemical X. Scientific reports later 
confirmed that the crops were all [thriving/dying] because of a fungus that had been 
secretly growing inside Sam’s pump. 
 
After reading the case, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
statement, “Sam knew that by pumping the water, the townspeople’s crops would 
[thrive/die].” Responses were collected on a seven-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). The Gettierized nature of the case would predict that the 
participants deny knowledge to Sam in both cases. But Buckwalter’s results show this 
expected result did not hold. Participants’ Gettier intuitions were overturned by their 
moral judgments of Sam in the harm condition: participants thought that Sam knew his 
actions would bring about harm (M=4.86, SD=1.7). In contrast, responses for the benefit 
condition were consistent with traditional Gettier case results: participants thought that 
Sam did not know (M=3.05, SD 1.59). Thus, Buckwalter’s results indicate not only that 
the lay concept of knowledge is sensitive to moral valence, but also that the moral factor 
can override the Gettier intuition, which is generally considered central to our 
understanding of knowledge. He refers to the robust impact of moral valence on people’s 
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knowledge attribution in Gettier cases6 as the Gettierized Epistemic Side-Effect Effect, or 
GESEE.  
Responding to the concern that knowledge attribution in the harm case is driven by 
the desire to blame the protagonist, Buckwalter introduced a third-person case where the 
purported knower differs from the wrongdoer. He found that in the third-person case, 
people were still much more likely to attribute knowledge to the knower in the harm 
condition than in the benefit condition. This suggests that moral valence has a robust 
impact on the lay concept of knowledge that cannot be explained away by the desire to 
blame the wrongdoer.7 
																																																								
6 GESEE captures the robust impact of moral valence on knowledge attribution. This impact does not 
always overturn the Gettier intuition as in our Chinese studies. Following Buckwalter, we refer to the 
epistemic side-effect effect obtained in Gettierized cases as GESEE, no matter whether the Gettier intuition 
is obtained in those cases. 
7 Based on his studies, Buckwalter (2013: 377) concluds that morality plays an important role in 
knowledge attribution. Two approaches may explain the observation: either moral valence directly affects 
knowledge attribution, or moral valence affects some mediating factor(s) which in turn affect(s) knowledge 
attribution. For example, Alfano, Beebe and Robinson (2012) argues that differently valenced side-effects 
engender asymmetric attributions of beliefs, which in turn generates asymmetric attribution of knowledge. 
Other mediating factors proposed to explain the original side-effect effect on intentionality attribution 
might, mutatis mutandis, also help explain GESEE (cf. Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo, 
2010; Sripada, 2012, and Scaife & Webber, 2013). Cova, Lantian, and Boudesseul (2016) show that even 
when controlling for those proposed mediators in mediation analyses, the direct impact of normative 
considerations remains significant, which suggests that “moral evaluations still play an irreducible role in 
shaping our judgments of intentionality” (2016: 12). Since we aim to investigate the unviersality of the 
pattern of knowledge attribution, we do not take a stance on which explanation is correct. 
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Our second study examined whether GESEE appears across different cultures. We 
translated the three vignettes (pump, mayor, third-person mayor) used in Buckwalter’s 
paper8 into Korean and Chinese, and tested them with our Korean and Chinese 
participants.  
 
Korean Study 
753 Korean participants were recruited through “IQEQCQ.” As Figure 5 shows, 
the GESEE appeared across all three vignettes with our Korean participants.  
We analyzed the data using a 3 (vignette: pump vs. mayor vs. third-person) x 2 
(valence: benefit vs. harm) ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of valence, F(1, 
747) = 67.6，p<.001, a significant main effect of vignette, F(2, 747) = 19.6，p<.001, 
and a significant interaction, F(2, 747) = 3.6，p=.03. 
																																																								
8 The mayor case and the third-person mayor cases can be found in the appendix.  
	 15 
 
Figure 3: Mean of Korean participants' weighted knowledge ascriptions about 
GESEE9 
 
Chinese Study  
We recruited 840 Chinese participants through a public account on “WeChat.” As 
Figure 5 shows, the GESEE appeared in the first two cases (pump and mayor) but did not 
appear in the third-person mayor case.  
We analyzed the data using a 3 (vignette: pump vs. mayor vs. third-person mayor) 
x 2 (valence: benefit vs. harm) ANOVA. We found a main effect of valence, F(1, 834) = 																																																								
9 Notably, for our Korean participants, the patterns of knowledge attribution across the three pairs of 
cases are almost exactly the same with the patterns reported by Buckwalter based on his English-speaking 
participants. First, in the pump cases, the Gettier intuition holds, and GESEE overrides it in the harm 
condition. Second, in the mayor and the third-person mayor cases, the Gettier intuition does not hold, but 
GESEE is robust. The story is more complicated with our Chinese participants. 
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11.5，p=.001, a main effect of vignette, F(2, 834) = 39.3, p<.001, and a significant 
interaction, F(2, 834) = 4.6, p=.01.  
To further explore this interaction, we examined each vignette separately. For the 
pump case, the weighted knowledge score was higher for the harm condition (M=-.2.01, 
SD=5.31) than the benefit condition (M=-3.00, SD=4.94), t(252)=-4.15, but the difference 
was not statistically significant, p=.098. For the mayor case, the weighted knowledge 
score was higher for the harm condition (M=2.67, SD=5.17) than the benefit condition 
(M=-0.19, SD=5.78), t(297)=-1.66, p<.001. For the third-person mayor case, the weighted 
knowledge score for the benefit condition (M=.62, SD=5.62) was very close to that for 
the harm condition (M=.64, SD=5.48), t(275)= -0.03, so there was virtually no difference, 
p=.98. 
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Figure 4: Mean of Chinese participants' weighted knowledge ascriptions about 
GESEE10 
 
Chinese Third-Person Study 
The results for the third-person mayor case may be due to (1) case-specific reasons 
(e.g., Chinese people have some peculiar ideas about mayors or their secretaries) or (2) 
the third-person nature of the case (i.e., Chinese people would respond to all third-person 
cases in a way that differs from how they respond to first-person cases). We conducted a 
second study on Chinese speakers in order to identify the correct explanation. We 																																																								
10 The results of our Chinese study differed from that of Buckwalter’s English study and that of our 
Korean study in various subtle ways. First, in the pump cases, the Gettier intuition held, but GESEE didn’t 
override it in the harm condition. Second, in the mayor cases, the Gettier intuition held weakly, and GESEE 
overrode it in the harm condition. Third, in the third-person mayor cases, the Gettier intuition didn’t hold, 
neither did GESEE. 
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designed two new third-person cases (the third-person pump and the third-person air 
case), and tested them alongside the original third-person mayor case on a new sample of 
Chinese participants (N=434) recruited on “Wechat”. The cases have the same structure 
as the third-person mayor case: the purported knower is a witness to the agent performing 
the benefit/harm action. Below is an English translation of the third-person pump case.11  
 
Wen Bin’s job is to pump water into the cistern, which then supplies the water to 
the farms owned by several families in the community. One day, as Wen Bin 
operates the pump, he hears a broadcast on the radio. The radio report says that a 
new chemical from a nearby factory, chemical X, has found its way into the local 
reservoir, and that it will be very [beneficial/poisonous] to all the local 
townspeople’s crops. Wen Bin continues pumping the water while chatting with 
his girlfriend, ‘‘I don’t care about their crops; I just want to earn my pay.’’ Wen 
Bin’s friend, Li Ming, overheard everything, and is appalled by what Wen Bin 
said. Sure enough, the crops started [thriving/dying]. It turned out that the radio 
broadcast got it wrong about the chemical in the water. After analyzing the water, 
scientists found no trace of chemical X at all. And later scientific reports further 
confirmed that the crops were all [thriving/dying] due to a totally different cause, 
i.e., a fungus that had been secretly growing inside the pump. 
 
																																																								
11 The Chinese third-person air and the Chinese third-person mayor case can be found in the appendix. 
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After reading the case, we asked the participants: “Do you agree or disagree with the 
statement, “Li Ming, Wen Bin’s friend, knew that the townspeople’s crops would 
[thrive/die], as he heard the broadcast and Wen Bin’s words”?”  
We analyzed the responses using a 3 (vignette: pump vs. air vs. job) x 2 (valence: 
benefit vs. harm) ANOVA. We found a main effect of valence, F(1, 428) = 8.9，p=.003, 
no effect of vignette, F(2, 428) = 1.6，p=.21, and a significant interaction, F(2, 428) = 
4.4，p=.01.  
To explore this effect further, we examined each vignette individually. For the 
third-person pump case, the weighted knowledge score was higher for the harm condition 
(M=-.48, SD=5.57) than the benefit condition (M=-3.3, SD=4.60), t(136)= -3.23, p=.002. 
For the third-person air case, the weighted knowledge score was higher for the harm 
condition (M=-.22, SD=5.52) than the benefit condition (M=-2.39, SD=5.11), t(145)= -
2.47, p=.014. For the third-person mayor case, there was no significant difference 
between the weighted knowledge for the benefit condition (M=-.2.09, SD=5.35) and the 
harm condition (M=-2.65, SD=4.77), t(147)= 0.68, p=.50. GESEE appeared in all cases 
except again for the third-person mayor case (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Mean of Chinese participants' weighted knowledge ascriptions about 
third-person cases for GESEE 
 
This result suggests that the absence of a significant GESEE in the Chinese 
participants for the third-person mayor case is due to case-specific reasons: Chinese 
people have some specific ideas about mayors and secretaries which interfered with their 
GESEE intuition. In other third-person cases, Chinese participants demonstrated the same 
pattern of GESEE. There was a significant difference in the level of knowledge 
attribution for the harm and benefit conditions.12  
																																																								
12 Though the GESEE pattern didn’t emerge both in our first and our second study of the third-person 
mayor case, participants’ responses to the case differed quite dramatically in the two studies. The weighted 
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 Discussion 
Both Korean and Chinese populations were found to exhibit GESEE. The results 
for both populations showed a striking asymmetry of knowledge attribution between 
harm and benefit conditions. Though this effect was not obtained in the third-person 
mayor case among our Chinese participants, Chinese participants indeed demonstrated 
GESEE in the other third-person cases. This outcome indicates that the Chinese result in 
the third-person mayor case was due to case-specific reasons, rather than reflecting 
anything more fundamental about their tendency to show the third-person GESEE.  
 																																																																																																																																																																					
knowledge scores (both in the benefit and harm condition) in the first Chinese study were positive meaning 
that the Gettier intuition didn’t hold, while those scores became negative in the second Chinese study, 
meaning that the Gettier intuition held. We think that the difference might be attributed to our different 
ways of framing the questions after participants read the vignette. In the first Chinese study, we gave 
participants the translation verbatim of Buckwalter’s third-person mayor case and the question followed, 
where we asked participants: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘James the office secretary 
knew that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs’?” In the second Chinese study, we 
changed the office secretary’s name James into Li Ming, and framed the question differently, where we 
asked participants: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘Li Ming, the office secretary knew that 
members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs, as he heard the conversation between the mayor 
and his economic strategists’?” (see the appendix). We think that the temporary element highlighted in the 
questions of our second Chinese study helped to prompt participants’ Gettier intuition. At the time when Li 
Ming heard the conversation between the mayor and the economic strategists, the mayor and the economic 
strategists were deliberating about a contract which was latter secretly swapped by the company and thus 
was not the one actually causing job increase/decrease. The presence of the temporary element was likely 
to prime the participants to focus on the causal disconnection between the facts of the world and Li Ming’s 
true belief about it, and thus led them to the denial of knowledge in both the harm and benefit conditions. 
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2.3 Knowing without Believing  
Knowledge used to be analyzed in terms of justified true belief. According to such an 
analysis, knowledge entails belief. Though this once-standard analysis has been 
discredited largely thanks to Gettier cases, the idea that knowledge entails belief 
continues to prevail among epistemologists. Proponents of the idea tend to rely on its 
intuitive appeal rather than theoretical arguments (Cohen 1966; Armstrong 1969, 1973; 
Sorenson 1982; Dartnall 1986; Steup 2001/2006). This makes their position vulnerable to 
counterexamples.  
In a recent empirical study, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013) presented five 
potential scenarios of knowledge without belief to ordinary English speakers. Each 
participant received only one scenario, with only one question at the end of it asking 
either whether the protagonist knew or believed the proposition in question. In three of 
the five scenarios, they found a significant effect where more people attributed 
knowledge but not the corresponding belief to the protagonist: 87% vs. 37% in the 
unconfident examinee case, 63% vs. 23% in the prejudiced professor case, and 83% vs. 
30% in the freaked-out movie-watcher case. The three pairs of cases went as follows:  
 
(1) The unconfident examinee (modified from Radford 1966): 
Kate spent many hours studying for her history exam. She’s now in class taking the 
exam. Everything’s going quite well, until she comes to the final question. It reads, 
“What year did Queen Elizabeth die?” Kate had reviewed this date many times. She 
had even recited the date to a friend just a few hours earlier. So, when Kate sees 
that this is the last question, she feels relieved. She confidently looks down at the 
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blank space, waiting to recollect the answer. But before she can remember it, the 
teacher interrupts and announces, “Alright, the class session is almost over. You 
have one more minute to finalize your answers.” Kate’s demeanor suddenly 
changes. She glances up at the clock, now flustered and worried. “Oh, no. I can’t 
perform well under this kind of pressure.” Her grip tightens around her pencil. She 
strains to recall the answer, but nothing comes to her. She quickly loses confidence. 
“I suppose I’ll just have to guess the answer,” she says to herself. With a sigh of 
disappointment, she decides to write “1603” into the blank space. This was, in fact, 
the correct answer. 
 
Did Kate know/believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603? yes no (circle one) 
 
(2) The prejudiced professor (modified from Schwitzgebel 2010): 
Juliet is a university professor. Unfortunately, she is also prejudiced against student 
athletes. In her classes, she calls more often on non-athletes than athletes, and she 
interprets the comments of the former more charitably. When two soccer players, 
Brett and Bernard, come to visit her in office hours, she treats them patronizingly, 
explaining the basic concepts of the course in a very rudimentary manner, failing to 
recognize the sophistication and intelligence behind their questions. They leave, 
and shortly after, two students with no involvement in school sports enter. Juliet 
immediately launches into a high-level discussion, generously assuming the 
students’ command of the elementary material. When Bernard writes the best essay 
in the course, revealing the intelligence that a neutral observer would have 
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recognized in his previous remarks, Juliet is surprised. All of this is typical of her.  
However, Juliet also repudiates all forms of prejudice. She openly affirms that 
students involved in athletics are just as capable as non-athletes. In fact, she has it 
on excellent authority that this is the case: Her chair just completed a study 
showing that the two groups perform equally well in their philosophy classes. 
Intrigued by this study, Juliet even reviews her own records and finds that, on 
average, the athletic students had actually performed better than the other students. 
But, in spite of all this, Juliet’s prejudice remains. She continues to treat her athletic 
students as if they are less intelligent than her other students. 
 
Does Juliet know/believe that her athletic students are as capable as her other 
students? yes no (circle one) 
 
(3) The freaked-out movie-watcher  
Susan loves to watch old horror films. She finally convinces her friend Jamie to 
watch one with her. It’s an old horror film that Susan actually considers to be quite 
funny, due to its unrealistic plot. The film begins with a group of astronauts who 
discover alien life on another planet. The aliens look somewhat like bumblebees, 
but they are dark-green and about two feet in length. The astronauts capture one of 
these creatures and bring it back to Earth. Once they have it on Earth, it manages to 
escape and starts laying numerous eggs. The eggs need water to hatch, so the 
creature lays the eggs in sink faucets. Thus, whenever people turn on their sink 
faucet, hundreds of newly hatched alien creatures fly out and begin to attack them.  
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During one of these attack scenes, Susan notices that Jamie is a bit tense. Susan 
remarks, “This isn’t bothering you, is it? Come on, you should be laughing at this 
movie. Look how unrealistic it is.” Jamie responds, “Yes, of course it’s unrealistic. 
But it’s still scary. I just don’t like these types of movies. They frighten me. Can’t 
we just watch something else?” “Well, I suppose,” Susan says. Susan then turns off 
the movie, and they quickly get ready for a second trip to the movie store.  
On the way out, Susan stops. “Hold on for a second. I’m thirsty. Let me grab a 
glass of water.” Susan walks over and begins to turn on the sink faucet. Suddenly, 
Jamie shouts, “No! Don’t do it!” The words come out of Jamie’s mouth before she 
even has time to consider what she’s saying. Jamie then looks over and sees that 
it’s only water coming out of the faucet. 
 
Did Jamie know/believe that only water would come out of the sink faucet? yes no 
(circle one) 
 
Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s finding provides strong evidence against the 
commonly assumed conceptual claim that knowledge entails belief. Our third study 
examined whether similar phenomena of knowledge without belief appear in other 
cultures. We translated the three scenarios (the unconfident examinee, the prejudiced 
professor, and the freaked-out movie-watcher) used in Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s 
study into Korean and Chinese, and tested them with our Korean and Chinese 
participants.  
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Korean Study 
We asked a few Korean friends to share our survey link with their students and 
colleagues, who were largely non-philosophers. We recruited 209 Korean participants in 
this way. 159 out of the 209 participants recruited online provided complete data. The 
analyses were conducted on those 159 participants.  
For the unconfident examinee vignette, a higher percentage of participants agreed 
that the agent knew (65.0%) than that the agent believed (15.0%), χ2(1, N = 40) = 10.4, p 
= 0.001. For the prejudiced professor vignette, a higher percentage of participants agreed 
that the agent knew (80.0%) than that the agent believed (36.4%), χ2(1, N = 63) = 12.2, p 
< 0.001. For the freaked-out movie-watcher vignette, a higher percentage of participants 
agreed that the agent knew (50.0%) than that the agent believed (35.3%), but this 
difference was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 56) =1.2, p = 0.275.   
To determine whether the movie case is in fact different from the other cases, we 
analyzed the data using two binary logistic regression models. In the first model we 
entered as predictors condition (knowledge vs. belief) and two dummy codes for the 
vignette (Movie, Professor). In the second model we also included two interaction terms 
(Movie x condition, Professor x condition). The comparison of these models indicated 
that condition did not significantly interact with the vignette, χ2 (2, N = 159) = 0.31, p = 
0.86. 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Korean participants who attributed knowledge or 
belief  
 
Chinese study 
We recruited 751 Chinese participants through the popular communication 
platform WeChat, and 613 of them provided complete data. The analyses were conducted 
on those 613 participants.  
For the unconfident examinee vignette, a higher percentage of participants agreed 
that the agent knew (79.3%) than that the agent believed (45.3%), χ2(1, N = 206) = 25.6, 
p < 0.001. For the prejudiced professor vignette, a higher percentage of participants 
agreed that the agent knew (64.4%) than that the agent believed (29.9%), χ2(1, N = 208) 
= 24.8, p < 0.001. For the freaked-out movie-watcher vignette, a higher percentage of 
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participants agreed that the agent knew (75.7%) than that the agent believed (31.3%), 
χ2(1, N =199) = 39.6, p < 0.001. 
 
 
Figure 7: Percentage of Chinese participants who attributed knowledge or 
belief  
 
Discussion 
In light of our results, both Korean and Chinese populations shared the intuition 
that an agent can know a proposition without believing it. The difference in knowledge 
and belief distribution was significant in all the three scenarios, i.e., the unconfident 
examinee, the prejudiced professor, and the freaked-out movie watcher in our study 
among Chinese speakers, as it was in the original study conducted by Myers-Schulz and 
Schwitzgebel with English speakers. While the difference in knowledge and belief 
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distribution was also significant in both the unconfident examinee and the prejudiced 
professor scenarios among our sample of Korean speakers, it was not significant in the 
freaked-out movie watcher scenario. However, as the binary logistic regression models 
show, this difference between the freaked-out movie watcher scenario and the other two 
scenarios in this Korean study was not itself significant.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Our studies examined three epistemic effects in three groups outside the US (South Korea, 
Taiwan and China): the perceptual vs probabilistic evidence effect; the Gettierized 
epistemic side effect effect (GESEE); and the knowing without believing effect. (1) 
Korean and Taiwanese participants, like Anglo-American participants in Friedman and 
Turri (2014), were more likely to attribute knowledge to beliefs based on perceptual 
evidence than on probabilistic evidence. (2) Chinese and Korean participants, resembling 
Anglo-American participants in Buckwalter’s (2013), demonstrated a striking asymmetry 
of knowledge attribution when an agent was harming rather than benefiting others. (3) 
Like Anglo-American participants in Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (2013), Chinese 
and Korean participants think an agent can know a proposition without believing it. In 
sum, each of the effects that we studied showed up in both cultural groups that we tested. 
Along with other work reporting cross-cultural convergences on patterns of 
knowledge attribution (Machery et al. 2017; Rose et al. 2017), our studies provide 
empirical evidence for the hypothesis that there is at least a core concept of knowledge 
that is commonly shared across cultures. Moreover, our studies shed new light on the 
shape of this core concept of knowledge. Given that patterns of knowledge attribution as 
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quirky and surprising as those we tested hold across cultures, we can reasonably expect 
significant overlap among the concepts of knowledge employed in various linguistic 
communities.  
The discussion to date about cross-cultural studies has predominantly focused on 
supposed cross-cultural differences, rather than similarities. Sparked largely by WNS, the 
dominant question has been, “What are the philosophical implications of cross-cultural 
differences in epistemic intuitions?” By focusing on such questions, interlocutors 
presupposed the existence of cross-cultural differences. However, the total body of 
evidence to date on cross-cultural intuitions does not support the existence of such 
differences. Instead of contemplating the implications of unfounded cross-cultural 
differences, we suggest that we further explore the significant cross-cultural universality 
of epistemic intuitions. This shift in philosophical focus would have the benefit of 
opening up a cluster of important questions for epistemology: (1) how far or how deep 
universality runs; (2) what best explains the robust universality; and (3) given the high 
degree of universality, what role intuition should play in epistemology. Though we will 
not be able to answer those questions, we want to suggest some ways in which such an 
inquiry could be fruitful.  
Concerning the first question, though evidence made available thus far—in 
Machery et al. (2017), Rose et al. (2017), and the current paper—suggests that patterns of 
knowledge attribution are robustly universal across cultures, future studies may find 
interesting cross-cultural divergences of knowledge attribution and thus help to 
demarcate the boundaries of this universal, core concept of knowledge. 
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Concerning the second question, at least two accounts seem both plausible as 
explanations of the robust universality of knowledge attribution supported by the current 
body of evidence: the pragmatist and the nativist explanation. According to the 
pragmatists (e.g., Craig 1990), we have a certain concept of knowledge because of its 
beneficial functions, for example, in preserving truth, identifying trustworthy informants, 
coordinating behaviors through enabling effective mind-reading.13 If we are to add a 
further plausible assumption that the ends served by the concept of knowledge largely 
converge across cultures, we can expect robust universality of the concept of knowledge 
across cultures (cf. Hannon 2015). Trial-and-error in social practice selects out useful 
applications of the concept and solidifies the meaning of “knowledge.” Rewards-and-
sanctions for new language learners (e.g., children) further spread and pass on the stable 
patterns of knowledge attribution.  
By contrast, according to the nativists, the basic concept of knowledge has been 
planted in human minds as a matter of our genetic make-up, which dictates (at least to a 
great extent) when we would attribute/deny knowledge in a given case.14 Recently, the 
innateness of the concept of knowledge has obtained some empirical support: both young 
																																																								
13 Craig (1990) offers a systematical elaboration and defense of the pragmatic understanding of the 
concept of knowledge. He singles out certifying reliable informants as the purpose of the concept of 
knowledge. Though we see merits of the pragmatic approach to analyzing the concept of knowledge, we 
share many critics’ skepticism that the concept of knowledge serves any unique purpose (c.f., for example, 
Rysiew 2012; Beebe 2012).   
14  This particular claim about our concept of knowledge fits into a broader picture of nativism 
expounded by Scholl and Leslie (1999), which holds that certain concepts in theory of mind (including 
belief, pretense, desire, and so forth) are innate. 
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children and other primates demonstrate a certain basic concept of knowledge—in the 
sense of immediate, accurate representation of reality—which they employ to make 
predictions about others’ behavior (cf. Hogrefe et al. 1986; Wellman & Liu 2004; Onishi 
& Baillargeon 2005; Marticorena et al. 2011).  
Theorists have argued that the innate concept of knowledge shared by babies and 
non-human primates would be too primitive to adequately explain the universality of our 
epistemic intuitions in highly sophisticated scenarios (e.g., Stich 2013). For example, if it 
turns out that the innate, basic core concept of knowledge is limited to immediate, 
accurate presentations of reality, a nativist account may have difficulty in explaining the 
universality of GESEE (cf. Part II, Sec. 2), as immediate accurate representations of 
reality are not sensitive to the moral valence of an action. We need further empirical 
studies, especially in primatology and developmental psychology, before we can 
confidently come down on one side between these competing accounts.  
Finally, many epistemologists take our epistemic intuitions as foundational 
building blocks for normative epistemological theories, which aim at elaborating the 
proper norms of, e.g., inquiry, belief-formation, and assertion. The robust universality of 
epistemic intuitions provides pro tanto justification for this evidential role that 
epistemologists have attributed to epistemic intuitions. Regardless of whether pragmatism 
or nativism turns out to be the right explanation for the robust universality, both accounts 
suggest that the concept of knowledge serves crucial functions. This is obviously true if 
pragmatism is the right explanation, but it is also likely to be the case even if nativism is 
true. An innate concept of knowledge that helps human survival and flourishing is more 
likely to be selected in the evolutionary process. If we still regard those ends as desirable, 
	 33 
it would be advisable to consult our epistemic intuitions for normative purposes. This 
would be true, especially in light of J.L. Austin’s comment: 
 
Our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth 
drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of 
many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since 
they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at 
least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are 
likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative 
method (Austin 1956).  
 
Giving a pro tanto evidential role to our epistemic intuitions does not mean that we 
simply defer to our de facto concept of knowledge as we build a normative epistemology. 
First, our innate concept of knowledge may be too thin to support elaborate 
epistemological theories. Second, what was beneficial for hunter-gathers may not be 
beneficial for those who live in the modern world. Finally, a unified concept of 
knowledge may have been called upon to serve multiple ends, for example, not only to 
guide our effort to discover “pure” theoretical truths but also to ground our moral 
criticism of the wrong-doers (as GESEE seems to suggest).15 There is no guarantee that 
																																																								
15 Though the third-person GESEE helps to mitigate the worry that the asymmetry of knowledge 
attribution in harm and benefit conditions is directly driven by the desire to blame the wrong-doer, it 
doesn’t rule out that the asymmetry is caused by the general, communal need to hold the wrong-doers 
responsible. Maybe because we want to attribute knowledge to the wrong-doer in order to hold him 
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those tasks are always mutually conducive or even compatible. Epistemologists have to 
make hard choices about prioritizing certain epistemic intuitions and discarding others 
when our epistemic intuitions are in tension. By searching for a reflective equilibrium, we 
will arrive at a refined concept of knowledge along with more elaborate norms for our 
epistemic practices.  
Having presented a sketch of what the coming discourse might look like after we 
shift our focus to epistemic universality, we would like to conclude our paper with an 
invitation for thinkers from wide-ranging academic circles (from experimental 
philosophy, traditional philosophy, psychology, primatology) to explore epistemic 
universality—its depth, explanations, and implications. We hope that this universality-
based discussion will transcend the differences-based debate.  
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Appendix  
The mayor case from Buckwalter 2014 
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with 
a local corporation. The math is all very complex, but all his economic strategists think 
that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for 
workers in the community. The mayor says, ‘‘all I really care about is campaign 
contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I 
agree.’’ So, he decides to sign their contract. The corporation, however, didn’t take any 
chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally different one right before the 
mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some cases the opposite of what the 
mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be sure it got what it wanted. Sure 
enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a number of members of the 
community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge donation to his reelection 
campaign. 
At the end of the story: 
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Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “The mayor knew that by signing the 
contract he would [create/cut jobs]”? 
 
The third-person mayor case from Buckwalter 2014 
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with 
a local corporation. The contract is very complex, but all his economic strategists think 
that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for 
workers in the community. The mayor says, ‘‘all I really care about is campaign 
contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I 
agree.’’ James the office secretary overheard everything, and is appalled by what the 
mayor said. Nonetheless, the mayor decides to sign the contract. The corporation, 
however, didn’t take any chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally 
different one right before the mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some 
cases the opposite of what the mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be 
sure it got what it wanted. Sure enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a 
number of members of the community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge 
donation to his reelection campaign. 
After the story:  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘‘James the office secretary knew that 
members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs’’? 
 
The Chinese third-person pump case 
Wen Bin’s job is to pump water into the cistern, which then supplies the water to the 
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farms owned by several families in the community. One day, as Wen Bin operates the 
pump, he hears a broadcast on the radio. The radio report says that a new chemical from a 
nearby factory, chemical X, has found its way into the local reservoir, and that it will be 
very [beneficial/poisonous] to all the local townspeople’s crops. Wen Bin continues 
pumping the water while chatting with his girlfriend, ‘‘I don’t care about their crops; I 
just want to earn my pay.’’ Wen Bin’s friend, Li Ming, overheard everything, and is 
appalled by what Wen Bin said. Sure enough, the crops started [thriving/dying]. It turned 
out that the radio broadcast got it wrong about the chemical in the water. After analyzing 
the water, scientists found no trace of chemical X at all. And later scientific reports 
further confirmed that the crops were all [thriving/dying] due to a totally different cause, 
i.e., a fungus that had been secretly growing inside the pump. 
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, Wen Bin’s friend, knew 
that the townspeople’s crops would [thrive/die], as he heard the broadcast and Wen Bin’s 
words”? 
 
The Chinese third-person air case 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “we are 
thinking of starting a new program. Based on careful and convincing analysis offered by 
our financial and tech experts, it will help us increase profits, but it will also 
[improve/harm] air quality of the city.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care 
at all about the air quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.” Thus, they decided to start the new program. The secretary of the chairman, Li 
Ming, overheard everything, and is appalled by what the chairman said. Sure enough, 
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shortly after the company started the new program, the air quality was 
[improved/harmed]. It turned out that the experts in the company got it wrong about the 
environmental effects of the new program. The new program actually has no effect at all 
to the air. The fact that the air quality had been [improved/harmed] was due to a totally 
different cause, i.e., a new waste disposal plant that had started to operate. 
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, the secretary of the 
chairman, knew that the air quality would be [improved/harmed], as he heard the 
conversation between the vice-president and the chairman”? 
 
The Chinese third-person mayor case 
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with 
a local corporation. The contract is very complex, but all his economic strategists think 
that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for 
workers in the community. The mayor says, ‘‘all I really care about is campaign 
contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I 
agree.’’ Li Ming, the office secretary overheard everything, and is appalled by what the 
mayor said. Nonetheless, the mayor decides to sign the contract. The corporation, 
however, didn’t take any chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally 
different one right before the mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some 
cases the opposite of what the mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be 
sure it got what it wanted. Sure enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a 
number of members of the community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge 
donation to his reelection campaign. 
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After the story:  
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, the office secretary knew 
that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs, as he heard the conversation 
between the mayor and his economic strategists”? 
